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CASE NOTES
the other in a wrongful death action and reduce the awards accord-
ingly. The reader of the Martinez case is left frustrated and con-
cerned at the harsh result, one which approaches punishment of a
bereaved parent who had no part in the tragic death of his child.
His grief, and his loss of the child's companionship and love, was
just as great regardless of the negligence of the other parent. Al-
though comparative negligence has mitigated the total bar to re-
covery reached in Klepper and Martinez, results such as those
reached by the trial court in Singletary will continue to plague the
conscience of the court if the avenue of escape in the revised
wrongful death act is not recognized.
If the Singletary view prevails, however, the courts can then
award the non-negligent parent as survivor of his child, just as
they do in personal injury actions." This is a more logical and hu-
mane approach than reached under the Klepper rule. It is also in
step with the majority of other jurisdictions which allow recovery
by the non-negligent parent in both personal injury and wrongful
death actions involving a minor child.
JULIA S. CHAPMAN
Water and Watercourses-PBLIC UsE-THE EFFECT OF PROP-
ERTY LAW AS A LIMITATION ON FEDERAL NAVIGATIONAL SERVI-
TUDE-Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
In 1961, Kaiser Aetna entered into an agreement with Bishop
Estate to develop a 6,000 acre area known today as Hawaii Kai on
the island of Oahu, Hawaii.1 The development agreement gave
Kaiser Aetna the right to lease Kuapa Pond, a 523 acre area
58. See Acevedo v. Acosta, 296 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Ward v. Baskin,
94 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1957).
1. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 167 (1979).
2. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Fishponds, regarded under Hawaiian property law as private property, were frequently
found within the boundaries of large land units called "Ahupua'as." Kuapa Pond, a
fishpond, was included in the Ahupua'a that eventually vested in Bishop Estate.
In its original state, Kuapa Pond was a shallow body of water contiguous to Maunalua
Bay and the Pacific Ocean but separated from the bay by a narrow barrier beach. The pond
was subject to the ebb and flow of the tide because of two natural openings in the barrier
beach and also because the tidal waters percolated through the beach into the pond.
For centuries prior to 1961, Kuapa Pond was used for aquatic agriculture. Early
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within the estate, for the purpose of creating a marina-style com-
munity and providing improvements such as dredging, walls, and
bridges.3
Kaiser Aetna signed a formal lease of Kuapa Pond on October
17, 1967.1 When Kaiser Aetna contacted the Army Corps of Engi-
neers (the Corps) concerning development plans to dredge and fill
the pond, it was advised by the Corps that no permit would be
required. 5 With the acquiescence of the Corps, Kaiser Aetna's
dredging and filling ultimately resulted in navigational access from
the pond to the bay.6
In 1972, after a dispute arose between Kaiser Aetna and the
Corps, the United States filed suit for declaratory and injunctive
relief in the United States District Court for the District of Ha-
waii.' The United States sought a declaration that Kaiser Aetna
Hawaiians reinforced the barrier beach with a stone wall and installed sluice gates in the
natural openings in order to allow small fish and water, but not large fish to escape. How-
ever, because of the barrier beach and stone wall, it was impossible to gain access to the bay
even with flat-bottomed boats. Id. at 2-6.
3. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 167 (1979).
4. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). The lease
was taken subject to earlier declared protective provisions which granted each waterfront lot
lessee a nonexclusive easement to use the waters of Kuapa Pond. In addition, the protective
provisions reserved to the lessor the right to adopt and enforce rules and regulations con-
cerning the use of the pond and to impose reasonable assessments on every marina lot lessee
to pay maintenance and operation costs.
Pursuant to such provisions, marina lot lessees were charged a yearly fee of $72.00. Also,
nonmarina lot lessees from Hawaii Kai and boat owners who were not residents of Hawaii
Kai who used the marina paid the $72.00 yearly fee.
Among other things, the yearly assessments helped to finance the use of patrol boats to
maintain the privacy and security of the pond. Id. at 7-8.
5. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 167 (1979).
6. Id.
7. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42 (D. Haw. 1976), rev'd, 584 F.2d 378,
(9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). A dispute arose between Kaiser Aetna and the
Corps of Engineers over the issue of free public access. In its correspondence with the
Corps, Kaiser Aetna specifically stated that its understanding was that there would be "no
requirement for public use of any waters on the Kuapa Pond side of the bridge." The Corps
never confirmed this particular point in return correspondence.
Although there is no direct evidence in either the court opinions or the parties' briefs
concerning the specific origin of the dispute, one possible explanation may be that Kaiser
Aetna's use of patrol boats to exclude unauthorized persons from Kuapa Pond apparently
caused some outrage on the part of the Corps which helped to precipitate this suit.
In addition, although Kaiser Aetna complied with the Corps' requirement for a work per-
mit in the pond after Kuapa Pond was connected to the bay and Pacific Ocean, Kaiser
Aetna specifically stated that it felt no permit was necessary because, in its opinion, Kuapa
Pond was not a navigable water of the United States. The combination of the above factors
apparently motivated the Corps to have these questions settled by the courts. Brief for Re-
spondent at 4-5, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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should be required to obtain the Corps' authorization, pursuant to
section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, which makes it unlawful
to alter or modify the condition or capacity of a navigable water of
the United States without permission.8 The United States also re-
quested that an injunction be granted requiring Kaiser Aetna to
refrain from interfering with public access to the pond.
The district court declared that Kuapa Pond was subject to the
Rivers and Harbors Act regulatory jurisdiction for two reasons: (1)
Kuapa Pond was found to be a navigable water of the United
States, and (2) the marina was "used in interstate commerce both
to raise revenue for Kaiser Aetna and to transport residents and
nonresidents by waterway into and out of Maunalua Bay." 10 The
district court denied the request for injunctive relief, concluding
that the right of public use did not necessarily follow from the gov-
ernment's right to regulate.11 Relying on the private nature of
fishponds under Hawaiian property law, the court further held
that the government lacked authority to open the pond to the pub-
lic without payment of compensation to the owner.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision that the pond fell within the
scope of congressional regulatory authority but reversed on the is-
8. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 45 (D. Haw. 1976), rev'd, 584 F.2d 378
(9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act
provides:
Obstruction of navigable waters generally; Wharves; piers; etc.; exca-
vations and filling in
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited; and it
shall not be lawful to build or commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin,
boom, weir, breakwater, bulkhead, jetty or other structure in any port, roadstead,
haven, harbor, canal, navigable river or other water of the United States, outside
established harbor lines, or where no harbor lines have been established, except on
plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of
the Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter
or modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, ha-
ven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor or refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any
breakwater, or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless
the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same.
33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
9. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 45 (D. Haw. 1976), rev'd, 584 F.2d 378
(9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
10. Id. at 53.
11. Id. at 54.
12. Id. at 51-54.
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sue of free public access.'s The court of appeals held that regula-
tory authority and the navigational servitude 4 cannot realistically
be separated; it is the public right which necessitates the exercise
of regulation. Therefore, Kaiser Aetna should be required to allow
public access to the pond."' The court also held that, since Kuapa
Pond was subject to an overriding federal navigational servitude,
no compensation was required.'
Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to determine
whether the court of appeals had committed error when it held
that the pond, by virtue of its improvements, had become subject
to an overriding federal navigational servitude not requiring com-
pensation. 7 The Court's purpose in granting certiorari in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States's was to resolve a conflict in interpreta-
tions of the nature and scope of the federal navigational servitude.
The navigational servitude (or national sovereignty over naviga-
ble waters) which is ultimately derived from the commerce clause
of the federal constitution gives rise to the governmental authority
to guarantee "that such streams retain their capacity to serve as
continuous highways for the purpose of navigation in interstate
13. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164
(1979).
14. The navigational servitude, a shorthand description for the national sovereignty over
navigable waters or dominant public interest in navigation, is firmly established. See United
States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) (the United States has an inherent power to regu-
late navigation which, in turn, confers upon it a dominant servitude); United States v. Twin
City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224-25 (1956) (the United States' power to assert its interests
over navigable waters is a privilege which has been described by the Court as a dominant
servitude or a superior navigation easement); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339
U.S. 725, 736 (1950) (recognizing a superior navigation easement since the government's
interest in navigable waters is considered to be predominant to that of a riparian owner);
United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386, 390 (1945) (in the interest of commerce,
the government necessarily must have a dominant power to control and regulate navigable
waters); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 62 (1913) (an
owner's title to fast land adjacent to navigable water is subordinate to the public right of
navigation).
15. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 164
(1979).
16. Id. at 383-84.
17. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 169 (1979).
18. Id. at 164. The Supreme Court wished to resolve a conflict between the Louisiana
Court of Appeals and the Ninth Circuit. In Vermilion Corp. v. Vaughn, 356 So. 2d 551, 555-
56 (La. Ct. of App. 1978), the court held that a canal constructed on private property with
private funds is a private canal and that the owner may rightfully exclude others. In United
States v. Kaiser Aetna, 584 F.2d 378, 383 (9th Cir. 1978), the court held that a natural
waterway on private property made navigable with private funds was subject to the right of
public access without compensation.
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commerce." 19 The government argued that disposition of Kaiser
Aetna should have been based primarily upon whether or not
Kuapa Pond could be classified as a "'navigable water of the
United States.' "20 A finding of navigability would have invoked
the federal navigational servitude which traditionally required no
compensation .2  The Court found, though, that the paramount is-
sue was not navigability, but rather, whether creating a free right
of access to the pond would constitute a "taking" requiring just
compensation.2 2 In addition, Kuapa Pond, prior to its improve-
ments, was clearly incapable of being used as a highway for com-
merce. 8 Despite the fact that it was navigable water, the Court did
not classify Kuapa Pond as the sort of " 'great navigable stream'
that was previously recognized as being "'[incapable of private
ownership ... "24
Although the Court did not question congressional authority to
regulate activities on Kuapa Pond,25 it considered "the Govern-
ment's attempt to create a public right of access [to be] so far be-
19. 444 U.S. at 177.
20. Id. at 170 (quoting Brief of the United States at 13). The Code of Federal Regula-
tions sets out the definition of the navigable waters of the United States as follows:
Navigable waters of the United States are those waters that are subject to the
ebb and flow of the tide and/or are presently used, or have been used in the past,
or may be susceptible for use to transport interstate or foreign commerce. A deter-
mination of navigability, once made, applies laterally over the entire surface of the
waterbody, and is not extinguished by later actions or events which impede or
destroy navigable capacity.
33 C.F.R. § 329.4 (1979). See also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S.
377 (1940) (navigable waters include all waters susceptible to use in their ordinary condition
or by reasonable improvement to transport interstate or foreign commerce); Economy Light
& Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921) (navigable waters include all waters used
in the past to transport interstate or foreign commerce); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557 (1870) (navigable waters include all waters presently used to transport interstate or
foreign commerce).
The power to regulate commerce necessarily encompasses the power to regulate naviga-
tion. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
21. 444 U.S. at 170. See generally Morreale, The Federal Power in Western Waters:
The Navigation Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1963).
22. 444 U.S. at 174-75.
23. Id. at 178. In United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 53 (D. Haw. 1976), the
district court found a connection to interstate commerce in the fact that use of Kuapa Pond
and access to Maunalua Bay through Kuapa Pond was not restricted solely to residents of
Hawaii-Kai but extended to licensees of Hawaii-Kai. Such a tenuous connection to inter-
state commerce was implicitly rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
24. Id. at 179 (quoting United States v. Chandler-Dunbar, 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913)).
25. Id. at 174. The Court stated that Congress could exercise its regulatory authority to
any extent it deemed necessary in the interest of commerce or navigation. Yet, a separate
issue arises as to whether that regulation amounts to a compensable taking. Id.
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yond ordinary regulation ... as to amount to a taking .... In
examining the "taking" question, the Court pointed to three im-
portant factors: "the economic impact of the regulation, its inter-
ference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the
character of the governmental actions .... ,,27
Interference with economic expectations and the Court's recog-
nition of "the right to exclude" others as a fundamental element of
property rights were dispositive factors in this case.28 The Court
implied that the Corps, in acquiescing to the dredging operations
in Kuapa Pond without requirement of a permit and without stip-
ulation that such improvements would automatically result in pub-
lic right of access, had led Kaiser Aetna to believe that multimil-
lion dollar improvements to the pond could be made exclusively
for the benefit of Hawaii Kai residents and authorized boat own-
ers. 2 9 In light of these facts, the Court found that Kaiser Aetna's
economic expectations were of such a substantial nature that the
government must refrain from interfering with those expectations
or compensate for their invasion.30 Imposition of a navigational
servitude in this case would have resulted not in an insubstantial
devaluation of private property, but rather, in "actual physical in-
vasion" of private property requiring just compensation.31
The purpose of this note is to explore the nature and scope of
the federal navigational servitude in light of the Kaiser Aetna de-
cision. Previously, the Court found it "inconceivable" that anyone
could obtain a proprietary interest in navigable waters. 2 However,
in Kaiser Aetna, where navigability was the end result of signifi-
cant investments to improve a private pond and where the affected
waters had not been used as highways for commerce, the Court
found petitioners had established a fundamental property interest
in the right to exclude others. Accordingly, the government's at-
tempt to create free public access to the navigable waters of the
pond constituted a "taking" requiring just compensation.
26. Id. at 178.
27. Id. at 175 (citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
28. Id. at 179-80.
29. Id. at 179.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 180.
32. United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913) (in a
condemnation proceeding instituted for the purpose of improving navigation in a river, the
Court denied the existence of private property interests in the water power potential of the
river).
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Not only Kaiser Aetna, but also its companion case, Vaughn v.
Vermilion Corp.," have focused attention on the federal govern-
ment's control over navigable waters of the United States. Tradi-
tionally, the Court has viewed the public interest as the predomi-
nant interest in navigation and, consequently, no compensation
has been required when the navigational servitude has been in-
voked in the name of that overriding public interest." However, as
a result of these two recent Supreme Court decisions, the very ex-
istence of the so-called rule of no compensation has been ques-
tioned. In Kaiser Aetna the Court stated, "this Court has never
held that the navigational servitude creates a blanket exception to
the Takings Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce
Clause authority to promote navigation."35 In other words, the Su-
preme Court has never officially recognized the rule of no compen-
sation under the navigational servitude. Without giving lip service
to the no compensation rule, prior decisions of the Court have cer-
tainly given support to such a concept and have led to the creation
of a rule of no compensation in the minds of legal commentators. *
In addition to the historical recognition accorded the naviga-
tional servitude, the commerce clause of the federal constitution
provides another basis for recognizing the dominant public interest
in navigable waters.3 7 Here, congressional power to regulate navi-
gation stems directly from the power to regulate commerce.3 8
As an adjunct to the commerce clause authority, the Court has
explicitly ruled that navigable waters are public property and thus
subject to congressional regulation. 9 Additionally, through United
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,4 0 it became evident that
congressional authority was not limited to control for navigation
but included control for other purposes such as flood protection
33. 444 U.S. 206 (1979). In Vaughn, the Court held that the public right of access did
not extend to man-made navigable waterways that were constructed on private land through
private expenditures even though the canals connected to pre-existing naturally navigable
waterways.
34. See Morreale, supra note 20, at 19-63; Ericsson, The Navigational Servitude and
Reserved Indian Property: Does the Rule of No Compensation Apply to Indian Interests
in Navigable Waters?, 1979 UTAH L. RaV. 57 (1979).
35. 444 U.S. at 172.
36. See, Morreale, supra note 20, at 19-63; Ericsson, supra note 34, at 58-63.
37. See Morreale, supra note 20, at 1-19.
38. Id. See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824) (state legislature's
attempt to grant a steamboat navigation monopoly struck by the Court as violative of the
commerce clause).
39. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865).
40. 311 U.S. 377, 426-27 (1940).
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and watershed development.
In the past, the rule of no compensation was applied in situa-
tions involving a riparian owner's "access to, and use, of navigable
waters." 41 The Court has held that no compensation is required for
loss in water power due to impairment of a navigable water's flow.
In United States v. Twin City Power Co.,42 a riparian owner
sought compensation for the enhanced value of his land as a pro-
spective site for a hydroelectric plant. The Court's view was that
since there can be no private vested interest in the flow of naviga-
ble waters, the United States was not required to compensate for
any special value of the land in relation to the use of the navigable
water.
Also, no compensation has been required for loss of access to
navigable water caused by necessary improvements.48 Although ac-
cess to navigable waters was permanently destroyed when the
United States erected a pier which was essential to the use of a
government-authorized canal and which was built on a riparian
owner's land submerged under navigable water, the Court in
Scranton v. Wheeler" disallowed compensation. The decision was
founded upon the principle that the riparian owners acquire title
to their lands subject to the paramount rights which the public has
in the navigation of such waters. Similarly, in United States v.
Commodore Park, Inc.,"5 a riparian owner's loss of access to navi-
gable waters went uncompensated when the government's dredging
operations in a bay for the purpose of creating suitable waters for
the operation of large seaplanes resulted in obstructive silt and
mud deposits in a formerly navigable tidal creek. The Court in
Commodore Park explicitly stated that "an owner of land adjacent
to navigable waters, whose fast lands are left uninvaded, has no
private riparian rights of access to the waters to do such things as
'fishing and boating and the like,' for which rights the government
must pay."'4"
In addition, the Court has not awarded compensation when ob-
structions, such as wharves or bridges, are removed or altered to
41. United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124-25 (1967).
42. 350 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1956).
43. See United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386 (1945); Scranton v.
Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900).
44. 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900).
45. 324 U.S. 386, 388 (1945).
46. 324 U.S. at 391 (footnote omitted). Fast lands are "lands bordering on navigable
waters but lying above the line of ordinary high water." Bartke, The Navigation Servitude
and Just Compensation-Struggle for a Doctrine, 48 ORE. L. REV. 1, 10 (1968).
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improve navigation despite their value to those who built them.
When Congress established a new harbor line which required de-
struction of waterfront wharves on the old harbor line, wharf own-
ers were denied compensation. And a requirement by the govern-
ment that a bridge be altered so that navigation be rendered free
and unobstructed did not constitute a taking within the meaning
of the Constitution since the requirement was merely incidental to
the exercise by the government of its power to regulate commerce
among the states. 8
Previously, the amount of private investment which had been
used to improve naturally existing navigable waters was not a deci-
sive factor in the Court's decisions.'9 As aptly stated by Justice
Blackmun in his dissenting opinion in Kaiser Aetna, "[a]ctions
taken to improve their value for the many caused no reimbursable
damage to the few who, by the accident of owning contiguous 'fast
land,' previously enjoyed the blessings of the common right in
greater measure.
'
"50
There is unquestionably a fine line between a noncompensable
loss and a compensable "taking" of property.51 The Court itself ad-
mitted that it has generally "been unable to develop any 'set
formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons.''52
However, violations of rights regarding "fast land," lands adja-
cent to navigable water, and non-navigable tributaries generally
have not called into play the rule of no compensation. Where the
47. Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1965).
48. Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907).
49. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. at 391.
50. 444 U.S. at 190 (citation omitted).
51. "Taking" is an expression for any type of publicly inflicted private injury for which
the Constitution requires payment of compensation. Four factors have been recognized as
critical in classifying a "taking" as compensable or not:
(1) whether or not the public or its agents have physically used or occupied some-
thing belonging to the claimant; (2) the size of the harm sustained by the claimant
or the degree to which his affected property has been devalued; (3) whether the
claimant's loss is or is not outweighed by the public's concomitant gain; (4)
whether the claimant has sustained any loss apart from restriction of his liberty to
conduct some activity considered harmful to other people.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HAnv. L. Rv. 1165, 1184 (1967). U.S. CONST. amend. V pro-
vides in pertinent part. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just
compensation."
52. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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government has physically invaded fast lands or destroyed the eco-
nomic value of such lands, compensation has generally been al-
lowed. In United States v. Virginia Electric & Power," where the
government acquired by condemnation a flowage easement over
1840 acres of fast land for the purpose of a dam and reservoir con-
struction project, the Court recognized the flowage easement as
"property" within the meaning of the fifth amendment and ruled
that it could not be appropriated for public use without compen-
sating the owner. In United States v. Cress," compensation was
awarded to a millowner where the level of a non-navigable tribu-
tary was raised by the government's construction and maintenance
of a lock and dam on the Cumberland River thus destroying the
power of a milldam which was essential to the value of the mill.
Kaiser Aetna, Virginia Electric and Cress, all cases arguably in-
volving actual physical invasion of private property, were con-
strued as compensable takings. In each case a governmental act
related to navigable waters resulted in a substantial and detrimen-
tal impact on economic expectations of private property owners.
The important distinguishing factor is that, in Virginia Electric
and Cress, the governmental acts affected private property in the
form of adjacent fast lands, whereas, in Kaiser Aetna, the asserted
private property interest which was affected was the navigable
water at issue.
In essence, the Kaiser Aetna decision represents a repudiation
by the Court of the existence of the no compensation rule in regard
to private ownership of navigable waters under certain circum-
stances. The Court decided that the takings clause of the fifth
amendment precludes the federal government from creating a pub-
lic right of access to a privately developed marina which opened to
the bay and ocean without paying just compensation." This deci-
sion was reached in spite of the fact that the former inland pond
now constituted "navigable water" and was recognized as such by
the Court" and that Kaiser Aetna's interest in the pond was obvi-
ously in the use of such navigable waters, a previously noncompen-
sable property interest.
As if to provide additional justification for its decision, the Court
analogized Kaiser Aetna's interest in the dredged pond "to that of
53. 365 U.s. 624, 625, 627-28 (1961).
54. 243 U.S. 316, 322 (1917).
55. 444 U.S. at 165.
56. Id. at 171.
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owners of fast land adjacent to navigable water '5 7 thereby placing
Kuapa Pond in the established category of compensable takings.
Under Hawaiian property law Kuapa Pond was considered
equivalent to fast land. In reality, though, Kuapa Pond's classifica-
tion whether as "fast land" or "navigable water" was not determi-
native. The Court could have easily reached the opposite verdict
by subjecting Kuapa Pond to the navigational servitude without
payment of compensation merely on the basis that the pond now
constituted navigable waters of the United States.
In Vaughn, the Court dispensed with any pretext of classifying
the navigable water as "fast land" in order to justify its decision.
In light of the Kaiser Aetna decision, the Court in Vaughn found
that man-made navigable waterways (canals) which are built with
private funds on private land and which are connected to naturally
navigable water are not subject to a public right of access.5 8 Al-
though the Court did not elaborate, it can be assumed that the
right to exclude others was again a dispositive factor.
The true significance of the Kaiser Aetna decision lies in the
Court's recognition of that fundamental property right, the right to
exclude others, as a limitation on the federal navigational servi-
tude. While a finding of navigability will no longer activate an au-
tomatic rule of no compensation, the government's actual power to
invoke the navigational servitude has not been curtailed. The prac-
tical effects of this decision will be felt particularly where it can be
demonstrated "that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to
the use or economic value of. . . property" that government-au-
thorized limitation of it may be adjudged to be a taking.6
JANICE KELLY
57. Id. at 179.
58. 444 U.S. at 206.
59. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2042 (1980). The Court in
PruneYard, a case relating to the exercise of free speech and petition on privately owned
shopping center property, cited Kaiser Aetna for the proposition that it is necessary "to
demonstrate that the 'right to exclude others' is so essential to the use or economic value of
.. . property that the State-authorized limitation of it [will amount] to a 'taking."' Id.
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